LIN-2002
mediumSuspicious Sudo Command Execution
Detects sudo invocations of common privilege-escalation / discovery tooling (e.g. shells, package managers used to drop binaries) that don't match routine admin activity - a coarse but useful first pass on sudo abuse.
Detection logic
{
"detection_type": "selection",
"selection": {
"process": "sudo",
"action": "command"
}
}Log source: product=linux, service=auth · Event ID(s): sudo_command
Required log fields
- user
- target_user
- command
- tty
Enabling this in your environment
Where: /etc/sudoers, /etc/audit/rules.d/
auditctl -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k sudoers_changes auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F euid=0 -k root_exec
Sudo already logs "COMMAND=" lines to /var/log/auth.log (Debian/Ubuntu) or /var/log/secure (RHEL) by default. For richer fields (full argv, TTY, working directory) enable auditd rules above so `command` and `tty` are populated for correlation, not just the raw syslog line.
False positives
- Legitimate admin scripts run interactively via sudo